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INTRODUCTION
When does deference to administrative regulation, that seeks to
prevent corporate fraud, cross the line from protecting the investor to
adversely impacting capital markets and the US economy? On
February 13, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
in a case of first impression for this circuit, addressed and upheld the
validity of a treasury regulation that requires taxpayers to use the cash
basis method of accounting when claiming deductions for interest
payments made to foreign related parties.1 The only other circuit court
of appeals to address this issue was a similarly-minded Third Circuit.2
However, the reasoning and rationale of both the Seventh and Third
Circuits marks a departure from the interpretation advocated by the
lower Tax Court in Tate & Lyle.3 These appellate decisions evidence a
continued trend of deference toward administrative regulation; all in

∗

J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, B.S. in Finance, 2004.
1
Square D Co. v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 438 F.3d 739 (7th
Cir. 2006).
2
Tate & Lyle v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 87 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 1996).
3
Tate & Lyle v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 103 T.C. 656 (1994).
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an effort for prevention of fraud and deceit in corporate America and
protection of U.S. tax revenue.4
In Square D Co. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service, the Seventh Circuit upheld the validity of Treasury
Regulation § 1.267(a)(3) (the “Regulation”) which requires U.S.
corporations to utilize the cash basis method of accounting when
deducting interest payments made to foreign related parties.5 This
interpretation of the Regulation, given the potential for abuse and
manipulation of the underlying transactions, places a necessary burden
on U.S. companies who seek to globalize and engage in transactions
with foreign parents or subsidiaries.6 Although the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation is correct, the reasoning supporting its decision is
lacking. Practically, the level of deference shown in this decision
marks the potential for a descent down a slippery slope in the
regulation of U.S. companies with related foreign parties. The broad
reach of the power of the Secretary, upheld by the Seventh Circuit,
leaves open the question of how far U.S. companies can and should be
regulated via administrative regulation. As an extreme example, if the
Treasury Secretary can require companies to use cash basis accounting
for these transactions, it does not seem to be outside the realm of
possibility that the Secretary could issue a regulation disallowing
interest deductions when such transactions are with foreign related
parties. This wave of regulation is on the cusp of over regulation and,
in light of increasing deference by courts, could result in discouraging
U.S. participation in global finance leading to an adverse economic
impact on the American companies and investors.
The first section of this Note provides background on the
differences between cash basis and accrual accounting methods and
relevant reasons for utilizing each. The second section of this Note
details the context of corporate regulation and its effect on American
companies in a global market place. The third section of this Note
contains an analysis of rationale for the Seventh Circuit’s
4

See, e.g., Tate & Lyle, 87 F.3d 99.
Square D, 438 F.3d at 747.
6
See id.
5
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interpretation of Treasury Regulation § 1.267(a)-(3) in Square D
Company v. Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, and the
relevant arguments against the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation.
Finally, the last section of this Note concludes that although the
Seventh Circuit’s decision was correct, based on the language and
legislative history of the Code, the decision ignored several
compelling arguments and should not be interpreted broadly to
indicate that courts need not aim a critical eye toward administrative
regulations aimed at preventing fraud.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) § 163(a) permits a
taxpayer to take a deduction on all interest paid, and in certain
circumstances on all interest accrued on indebtedness, within a taxable
year.7 However, other provisions of the Code determine which of these
two alternatives is applicable.8 Special rules govern deductions taken
based on transactions with related parties.9 There are certain types of
payments to related parties, for example interest payments, where a
taxpayer can claim a deduction.10 The Code grants the Secretary of the
Treasury the power to enact regulations regarding payments to foreign
related parties and generally requires the cash basis method of
accounting to be utilized when claiming a deduction based on a
transaction with a foreign related party.11 Yet, there are a limited
number of exceptions for certain types of payments to foreign related
parties that do not have to utilize the cash basis method of
accounting.12
7

I.R.C. § 163(a) (2006).
I.R.C. § 448 (a), (b)(3) (2002).
9
I.R.C. § 267 (2004) (noting in § 267 (a)(1) that generally, a taxpayer cannot
take a deduction for a loss from a sale or exchange of property with a related
person).
10
I.R.C. § 267.
11
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267(a)(3).
12
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3(c)(2) (2006) (noting items exempt from
taxation by treaty).
8
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The accrual method of accounting differs from the cash basis
method in many notable respects.13 For example, under the “all events
test” of the accrual method, a corporation must include “income and
deductions in the taxable year in which the income or liability is fixed
and can be determined with ‘reasonable accuracy.’”14 This differs from
the cash basis method, which requires a corporation to include all
income and deductions for the year in which the expenses are actually
paid or received.15 In other words, cash basis and accrual accounting
use different standards and criteria to determine when revenues and
expenses must be recognized and recorded.16 Under the cash basis
method, income and expenses are never counted until money comes in
or goes out.17 Under the accrual method because transactions are
counted when the event occurs, a company does not have to wait until
the money is actually paid or received to record the transaction.18 The
only meaningful difference between these two methods of accounting
is in the timing of when transactions are accounted for or recorded.19
A number of factors often determine the decision of whether a
company will utilize the cash basis or accrual method of accounting.
Initially, some corporations are required by the Code to utilize a
13

See Square D v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 438 F.3d 739, 74142 (7th Cir. 2006).
14
Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(ii) (2006)).
15
I.R.C. § 446(c)(1), (2) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(i).
16
See Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 103 T.C. 656, 668-69
(1994).
17
Id.
18
Id. For example, if a corporation makes a purchase on credit, and takes the
purchase in 2006, but does not pay for it until 2007 the way in which the expense is
recorded varies between the cash basis and accrual methods of accounting. Using the
cash basis method, you would record the expense in the 2007, the year when you
actually paid for the purchase. However, under the accrual method, you would
record the expense in 2006, when you take the purchase and incur the obligation to
pay for it.
19
The substance of this Note deals only with recording and reporting of
transactions for purposes of taxation. It should be noted that many large companies
record transactions, depreciation, etc. differently for purposes of management and
make adjustments for purposes of taxation.
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specific method of accounting.20 Businesses are required to use the
accrual method in several instances: if the business has inventory; if
the business is a C corporation; or if gross annual sales exceed five
million dollars, with certain exceptions for personal service
companies, sole proprietorships, farming business, and a few others.21
However, accrual accounting can be more costly to maintain,
because it requires the recording of more transactions.22 Cash basis
accounting is easier for smaller, simpler companies that do not have a
great deal of transactions or credit involved in their business models.23
In deciding which method to utilize, corporations should consider the
opinions and interests of their creditors, shareholders, and the
reporting authorities including the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).24
Generally, for large corporations and complex entities, cash basis may
be inadequate because it not only fails to project future cash flows
anticipated in the subsequent years by the corporation, but it also does
not provide a proper analysis of the economics of the organization,
thus hindering management decision making.25
Critics of allowing accrual accounting for tax purposes cite the
ease of manipulation in order to justify the imposition of a mandatory
cash basis method.26 Because under the accrual method, cash basis is
not tracked, it is easier for related parties to concoct situations where
transactions are made strictly to avoid tax liability.27 For example, a
parent corporation could make a loan to its subsidiary. The subsidiary
could then deduct its interest payments every year as they accrue, but
never actually pay that interest to the related party. This scenario is of
20

See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 446, 448.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 448.
22
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-1
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
See I.R.C.§ 448
26
Karl S. Coplan, Protecting the Public Fisc: Fighting Accrual Abuse with
Section 446 Discretion, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 378 (March, 1983) (discussing the
various ways that accrual accounting can be manipulated).
27
Id.
21
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all the more concern when the parent corporation is foreign because
the IRS has no way to substantiate or confirm the eventual payment of
the interest expense.28 Because the interest income is never taxed by
the United States, as it would have been had the parent been a
domestic corporation, it is difficult for the IRS to confirm that these
transactions are anything more than shams to avoid tax liability.29
In light of the concerns regarding manipulation and fraud based
upon the difference between accrual and cash basis accounting
methods, special rules and regulations have been promulgated to
govern situations involving deductions based on transactions with a
“related person or corporation.”30 Generally, a taxpayer is not
28

Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 103 T.C. 656, 660 (1994)
(citing Metzger Trust v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 75-76 (1981), affd. 693 F.2d 459 (5th Cir.
1982)).
29
Tate & Lyle, 103 T.C. at 660.
30
The Code § 267(b) sets forth those relationships that qualify taxpayers as
related parties.
The relevant relationships include: (1) Members of a family; (2)
An individual and a corporation more than 50 percent in value of
the outstanding stock of which is owned, directly or indirectly, by
or for such individual; (3) Two corporations which are members of
the same controlled group (as defined in subsection (f)); (4) A
grantor and a fiduciary of any trust; (5) a fiduciary of a trust and a
fiduciary of another trust, if the same person is a grantor of both
trusts; (6) a fiduciary of a trust and a beneficiary of such trust; (7)
a fiduciary of a trust and a beneficiary of another trust, if the same
person is a grantor of both trusts; (8) A fiduciary of a trust and a
corporation more than 50 percent in value of the outstanding stock
of which is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for the trust or by
or for a person who is a grantor of the trust; (9) A person and an
organization to which section 501 (relating to certain educational
and charitable organizations which are exempt from tax) applies
and which is controlled directly or indirectly by such person or (if
such person is an individual) by members of the family of such
individual; (10) A corporation and a partnership if the same
persons own – (A) more than 50 percent in value of the
outstanding stock of the corporation; and (B) more than 50 percent
of the capital interest, or the profits interest, in the partnership;
(11) An S corporation and another S corporation if the same
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permitted to take a deduction from its tax liability based on a loss from
a sale of property when the parties are related.31 This provision does
not stand as a bright-line rule barring all deductions on transactions
with related parties.32 Code § 267(a)(2) permits deductions for
payments made to related parties, but qualifies the deductions when
the parties calculate tax liability based on different accounting
systems.33 If the parties use different systems of accounting, the party
seeking to utilize the deduction may only apply the deduction to its tax
liability in the same year that the related party recognizes the
income.34 Practically, this code provision requires the related parties to
“[m]atch[]” one another’s systems of accounting.35 For example, if the
related payee is on the cash basis, the taxpayer will only be able to
claim the deduction when the money is actually paid, irrespective of
whether or not the taxpayer generally reports on an accrual.36
Conversely, if the related payee reports on an accrual, the taxpayer can
only claim the deduction when the deduction accrues even if generally
a cash basis reporter.37
When one of the related parties is a foreign entity, the Code
includes additional regulations to govern this relationship.38 In this
field of regulation, the Secretary of the Treasury (the “Secretary”) is
charged with promulgating and enacting regulations.39 Specifically, the
Secretary shall be charged with disseminating regulations to apply the
persons own more than 50 percent in value of the outstanding
stock in each corporation; or (12) An S corporation and a C
corporation, if the same persons own more than 50 percent in
value of the outstanding stock in each corporation. I.R.C. § 267(b).
31
I.R.C. § 267(a)(1).
32
See I.R.C. § 267 (a)(2).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Square D v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 438 F.3d 739, 741-42
(7th Cir. 2006).
37
Id. at 741.
38
See, e.g., I.R.C §§ 163(e)(3); 267.
39
I.R.C. § 267(a)(3).
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“‘matching principle of [ § 267 (a)(2)] in cases in which the person to
whom the payment is made is not a United States person.’”40 Under
this delegation of authority, the Secretary set forth a directive (the
Regulation) that requires the use of the cash basis method of
accounting, with certain carve-out exemptions, when a party seeks to
claim deductions to a related foreign person.41 For example, the
aforementioned regulation exemption “ ‘applies to any amount that is
income of a related foreign person with respect to which the related
foreign person is exempt from United States taxation on the amount
owed pursuant to a treaty obligation of the United states,’ except for
interest.”42 When a related foreign person accrues interest not
effectively connected with the income generated43 by the foreign party,
that interest is not exempt and is governed by the Regulations and
thus, the cash basis method.44
II. CONTEXT OF OTHER LAWS AND REGULATIONS
U.S. corporations with foreign parent companies or foreign
companies with substantial U.S. operations are a highly regulated
group.45 Within the tax context, the early 1990’s began a wave of
regulations applying to these foreign related parties, with a strict eye
40

Square D v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 438 F.3d 739, 742 (7th
Cir. 2006) (quoting I.R.C. § 267(a)(3)) (alteration in original).
41
Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3(b)-(c)(2) (2006).
42
Square D, 438 F.3d at 742 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3(c)(2)).
43
See, e.g., J.C. Lewenhaupt, 20 TC 151 (1953); A foreign corporation
generally will not be subject to direct U.S. taxation unless it is “engaged in a trade or
business in the United States.” Although the Code does no explicitly define the
phrase “trade or business” the case law has been interpreted to suggest that activity
will not constitute a “trade or business” unless it is “considerable, continuous, and
regular.” Gregg D. Lemein, John D. McDonald, and Stewart R. Lipeles, Twists and
Turns in the U.S. – Source Rules, Sep. 12, 2005, available at
http://vcexperts.com/vce/news/buzz/archive.
44
Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3(b); Gregg D. Lemein, John D. McDonald, and
Stewart R. Lipeles, Twists and Turns in the U.S. – Source Rules, Sep. 12, 2005,
available at http://vcexperts.com/vce/news/buzz/archive..
45
See, e.g., I.R.C §§ 163; 237.
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toward their purported tax liability.46 Several studies, commissioned
by the IRS have indicated that foreign owned businesses operating in
the U.S. have manipulated the tax structure to their advantage, to the
tune of several billion dollars.47 Many legislators are advocates of
stricter regulatory provisions on this subject because in terms of the
American economy, specifically the tax structure, these corporations
represent a giant “potential cash cow.”48 For example, where an
interest payment is never taxed as income, the IRS is essentially losing
whatever interest expense is deducted, because there is no
corresponding tax liability from an increase in the payee’s gross
income.49
The regulations governing transfer pricing are perhaps the greatest
examples of regulations that are aimed at preventing abuse and fraud
by foreign related parties. Transfer pricing refers to the pricing of
goods and services within a single organization.50 Serious tax issues
arise when cross-border transactions are involved.51 For example,
goods may be sold from one division to another, from one subsidiary
to another, or from a parent to a subsidiary where the decisions as to
the price affect the distribution of profits and losses amongst the
different legal entities within the same organization.52 Although the
use of transfer pricing in global corporations often has an honest and
important purpose, it is particularly subject to abuse.53 Often it is in the
best interest of the organization to arbitrarily select a price where the
46

Angus McDowell, The Chartered Minefield of U.S. Company Tax, June 27,
1998, available at
http://www.mcdowell.com/mcgeneral/a_misc/articles/art_uscomtax.htm (noting that
Angus McDowell is the past president of the Association of Chartered Accountants
in the United States).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
See id.
50
See I.R.C. § 482 (2006); Boeing Co v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 440-48
(2003); http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transfer_pricing.
51
See I.R.C. § 482.
52
Id.
53
Id.
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highest profit margin occurs in a country with the most favorable tax
structure.54 These types of transactions have led to the rise of transfer
pricing regulations because governments seek to stem the flow of
taxation revenue overseas.55
For the purposes of U.S. tax liability, § 482 of the Code governs
transfer pricing.56 Section 482 provides57:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or
businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not
organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
the same interests, the Secretary may distribute,
apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits
or allowances between or among such organizations,
trades or businesses, if he determines that such
distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary
in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly reflect the
income of any such organizations, trades, or businesses.
In certain cases, such as between special related parties “no deduction
shall be allowed in respect of any loss from the sale or exchange of
property, directly or indirectly, between persons” when the
transactions occur between parties with certain relationships.58 These
relationships include, among other, those between family members,
54

See I.R.C. § 482; E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. U.S., 608 F.2d 445,
449-52 (Cl. Ct. 1979).
55
See generally I.R.C § 482.
56
Section 482 of the Code authorizes the IRS to adjust the income, deductions,
credits, or allowances of commonly controlled taxpayers to prevent evasion of taxes
or to clearly reflect their income. The regulations under § 482 generally provide that
prices charged by one affiliate to another, in an inter-company transaction involving
the transfer of goods, services, or intangibles, yield results that are consistent with
the results that would have been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in
the same transaction under the same circumstances.
57
I.R.C. § 482 (emphasis added).
58
I.R.C. § 267.
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individuals and the corporations they control, the grantors or
beneficiaries of a trust and its fiduciaries, and two corporations which
are members of the same controlled group.59 The basis for these
regulations stems from the ease of manipulation and the possibility for
fraudulent transfers that would cause the financials of a company to
look more favorable than they are.60 For example, if one wants to
generate a loss to offset tax liability, by selling to one’s parent
company for $80 stock purchased for $100, § 267(a)(1) will preclude
the deduction of the loss because of the nature of the relationship.61
This limitation on deductions for transfers between related parties
protects against “sham transactions” and manipulations without
economic substance.62 However, it should be noted that “there are
often honest and important non-tax reasons for sales between related
parties, so it [is] important to fairness to preserve [these transactions
and] the pre-sale basis where loss on the sale itself is [not] recognized
for tax purposes.”63 “A variant of this scheme applies to ‘controlled
groups,’ that is, corporations with interlocking ownership as specified
by statute.64 Instead of being disallowed under § 267(a)(1), the loss is
‘deferred’ under § 267(f)(2) until one of two conditions pertains either:
(1) until the property is transferred outside such controlled group and
there would be recognition of loss under consolidated return
principles; or (2) until such other time as may be prescribed in
regulations.”65 These regulations, although preventing fraud and
abuse, place a burden on American companies that are attempting to
use related party transactions to compete in a global marketplace.
Another example of the strict regulation of foreign related party
transactions is the stringent requirements that corporations must
59

I.R.C. 267(a)(1), (b).
See id.; McWilliams v. C.I.R., 331 U.S. 694, 700-701 (1947).
61
Unionbancal Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 305 F.3d 976, 978 (9th
Cir. 2002).
62
See McWilliams, 331 U.S. at 700-701.
63
Unionbancal, 305 F.3d at 978-79.
64
Id. at 979 (citing I.R.C §§ 267(b)(3), 267(f)(1), 1563).
65
Unionbancal, 305 F.3d at 978-79.
60
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adhere to if engaged in these types of transactions. Specifically,
§ 6038(a) governs the reporting requirements on transactions with
foreign related parties.66 This provision was enacted to impose a
higher standard of reporting requirements on foreign controlled U.S.
corporations and branches of foreign corporations.67 Section 6038(a)
requires domestic corporations that are 25% foreign owned to furnish
records to the IRS to justify transactions with foreign shareholders.68
The penalties associated with non-compliance are extremely harsh,
such that a corporation has no option but to comply with the
requirements, even if in order to substantiate the transaction the
company must produce books from all over the world.69 Companies
are then forced to justify the expenses and transactions under the IRS’
“profitability” standard which determines the amount of tax that
should be imposed based on a number of questions including: “would
the financial and commercial arrangements have been the same”; if the
entities had not been related, would the transaction have occurred;
etc.70 This Code provision essentially grants the Secretary the broad
authority to seek any information, even that tangentially related to a
transaction, under the justification of preventing fraud and deceit. The
ultimate purpose of the legislation is to provide the IRS with sufficient
information to compute accurate transfer prices based on its economic
model. However, the IRS can then replace the recorded book figures
for transactions between related parties with the amounts that it
chooses and in the case of insufficient records, it can choose almost
any figure.71

66

I.R.C § 6038 (1998).
ASAT, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 108 T.C. 147 (1997).
68
Nissei Sangyo America Ltd. v. United States, 1995 WL 263473, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. 1995) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 247, at 1296-97 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2766-67)).
69
Angus McDowell, The Chartered Minefield of U.S. Company Tax, June 27,
1998, available at
http://www.mcdowell.com/mcgeneral/a_misc/articles/art_uscomtax.htm.
70
Id.
71
Id.
67
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There are several legitimate reasons to use interrelated
transactions, such as accounting for time spent from the home office
consulting with other divisions, transfers of materials, and services
such as research and development.72 This level of regulation is a great
burden on corporations, and requires extreme diligence (and expense)
to fully comply.73 Foreign companies may see this regulation, in the
context of the other regulations that impact corporate conduct as a
deterrent to U.S. market entry or current U.S. market position. This
amount of discretion and broad authority granted to the Secretary
could have unforeseen consequences as corporations looking to
streamline, decrease costs, and improve efficiency may take a close
look or have a second thought before they enter or remain in the U.S.
marketplace.
III. THE VALIDITY OF REGULATION 1.267(A)-3.
In Square D, the Seventh Circuit upheld the validity of Reg.
1.267(a)-3, which requires a taxpayer to use the cash basis method of
accounting with respect to the deduction of interest owed to a related
foreign party.74 This issue was a matter of first impression for the
Seventh Circuit. In both its reasoning and decision, the Seventh Circuit
relied heavily on the analysis presented by the Third Circuit, which
decided a factually analogous case.75 The Seventh Circuit has reasoned
that as a general matter, “ ‘[r]espect for the decisions of other circuit
courts is especially important in tax cases due to the importance of
uniformity, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of another circuit
72

Id.
Id. (noting that this new tax regime will have several costs associated with it
including: the costs of the disruptions by IRS investigations; time spent reviewing
records and obtaining additional information from old or international records; and
costs of professional, legal and accounting advice will likely be significant as there
may be a lot of transactions that could be characterized in many different ways).
74
Square D Co. v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 438 F.3d 739 (7th
Cir. 2006).
75
Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 87 F.3d 99 (3d
Cir. 1996)
73
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should be followed unless it is shown to be incorrect.’”76 “Although
we are not bound by them, we ‘carefully and respectfully consider’ the
opinions of our sister circuits.”77
A. Square D
Square D, an accrual taxpayer, was acquired by Schneider S.A., a
French Corporation, in 1991.78 As a result of the acquisition, Square D
borrowed additional funds and ended up with a four hundred million
dollar debt to Schneider.79 It accrued interest to Schneider in 1991 and
1992 but it did not deduct these amounts in its tax returns for those
years.80 Square D paid the accrued interest on these loans in 1995 and
1996.81 Since Schneider was a resident of France, the interest paid to it
by Square D was exempt from U.S. tax under the United States-France
income tax treaty.82 However, after an audit of Square D’s financials,
the Internal Revenue Service charged Square D for the deficiencies
evidenced in its 1991 and 1992 tax returns.83 Square D informally
requested that it be permitted to deduct the accrued amounts in order
to offset the deficiency.84 The Tax Court denied the allowance of a
deduction based on the interest expense accrued and upheld the
76

Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 40
F.3d 224, 226-27 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 527
F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1975)).
77
330 W. Hubbard Rest. Corp. v. United States, 203 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir.
2000).
78
Id. (noting that Schneider acquired Square D by means of a hostile takeover,
initially acquiring Square D through a special purpose entity that was later merged
into the Schneider corporation).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
1967 Double Taxation Convention, U.S.-Fr., Article 10(1), Oct. 27, 1979,
RIA TAXT 2168.
83
Square D v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 118 T.C. 299, 300-03
(2002)
84
Id.
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validity of the Regulation.85 It is these deficiencies that are the subject
of this analysis as Square D challenged the deficiencies and argued
that it should be allowed to deduct the interest accrued to Schneider in
1991 and 1992, thus eliminating any deficiency.86
The first challenge that Square D presented was to the validity of
Regulation 1.267(a)-3, arguing that this regulation was unreasonable
given the clear meaning of the language of § 267(a)(2)-(3).87 Square D
argued that the language of § 267(a)(3) limited the power of the
Secretary to only promulgate a regulation that applied the “matching
principle” articulated in § 267(a)(2) in the context of foreign related
parties.88 Square D’s French parent company, Schneider, was not
subject to U.S. tax liability and had no U.S. tax liability or method of
accounting for tax liability to match against.89 Square D argued that
the Secretary’s regulation, mandating use of the cash basis method of
accounting, was beyond the scope of authority granted to the Secretary
under the plain language of the Code.90
The issue presented involved the Seventh Circuit’s determination
of the validity of a regulation; hence, the analysis of the court was
governed by a two-step Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. inquiry.91 First, a determination whether the
85

Id.
Square D v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 438 F.3d 739, 742-43
(7th Cir. 2006)
87
Id.
88
Id. (noting that section 267(a)(2) generally provides that in the case of
certain related parties, if the person to whom the amount is owed, as a result of that
person’s method of accounting, is not required to include that item in income (unless
actually paid), then the person who owed the amount cannot deduct it from their
income tax liability until it is includable by the recipient of the income).
89
See id.
90
Id. at 743.
91
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). A Chevron analysis requires a court to first ask
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” and if
Congress’ intent is clear from the plain language of the statute the inquiry must
cease. However, if the court concludes that Congress has not directly addressed the
issue or that the statute is ambiguous, then the court must determine whether the
agency’s interpretation “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id.
86
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plain meaning of the relevant Code provisions clearly support or
oppose the validity of the regulation; and second, if the plain meaning
is either silent or unclear the Court must evaluate the reasonableness
of the regulation in light of the language, overall structure, intent and
purpose of the statute.92 However, under Chevron, “when reviewing an
agency’s regulatory implementation of a statute, [the court] look[s]
first to the intent of Congress” and only if that intent is unclear is it the
duty of the court to determine if the regulation is a reasonable
interpretation, while giving deference to the Commissioner’s
interpretation.93
1. Plain Language of the Statute
The Seventh Circuit, acting under a Chevron analysis, determined
that the Code supported the Regulation.94 The court declined to look at
the Code provisions in a vacuum, rather reading the provisions
together in order to ascertain the plain meaning.95 One of the
fundamental canons of statutory construction is that a statute should be
construed to give meaning to all provisions and that on the whole no
clause or word should be rendered void, insignificant or redundant.96
Under Chevron, all words should be read in context.97 Therefore, if,
§ 267(a)(3) merely authorized the Secretary to mechanically
implement, with no modifications or alterations, the provisions of
§ 267(a)(2) to foreign related parties it would be redundant given that
92

See id. at 843.
Square D, 118 T.C. at 307 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
94
Square D, 438 F.3d at 745
95
Id. When ascertaining the plain meaning of a statute, the court must look to
the statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a
whole. See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000); K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291
(1988).
96
Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 489 n.13 (2004);
Cole v. U.S. Capital Inc., 389 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 2004).
97
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)
(citations omitted).
93
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§ 267(a)(2) plainly does not distinguish between domestic and foreign
related parties and thus logically applies to both.98 Section 267(a)(2)
already applied to both foreign and domestic parties, rendering
§ 267(a)(3) “surplusage” unless it extends the meaning articulated in
§ 267(a)(2).99 Moreover, § 267(a)(2) was enacted two years before
§ 267(a)(3), which can be interpreted as shaping the provisions already
included in the Code.100 The inclusion of the provision, given the
statutory scheme as a whole, suggests that § 267(a)(3) has a distinct
meaning which is ambiguous and dictates a further analysis.101
2.

Legislative History

In Square D, because the provisions were ambiguous, in order to
determine the validity of the regulation the Court looked to whether
the interpretation set forth by the Secretary was a reasonable one.102
With regard to the legislative history surrounding § 267(a)(2) the
Court noted that the Congressional climate was focused on attempting
to restrain fraud and abuse in related party transactions as these types
of transactions were easily manipulated by parties to shield profits and
avoid tax liability.103 Under the precursor to I.R.C. § 267(a)(2),
Congress imposed an extremely strict limitation on interest

98

Square D, 438 F.3d at 745 (explaining that § 267(a)(3) grants the Secretary
the discretion to issue regulations to apply the matching principle in cases where the
person to whom the payment is made is not a United States person).
99
Id.
100
See id. at 746.
101
Id. at 745.
102
In cases where “Congress has made an express delegation of authority to
enact regulations, ‘[s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’” Id. (citing
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
103
Square D, 438 F.3d at 746 (citing I.R.C § 267(a)(2) (previously Revenue
Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-377 §301(c) which became § 267(a)(2) in 1954)).
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transactions between related parties.104 The initial enactment of
§ 267(a)(2) “permanently disallowed deductions for . . . interest
accrued during the taxable year but not paid within two and one-half
months after the close of the year if the payee was related to the
taxpayer and, because of the payee’s method of accounting, the payee
did not include the accrued interest in its income.”105 However,
Congress amended § 267(a)(2) to include the “matching principle” to
remedy the unduly harsh results that occurred as a result of the
permanent disallowance of deduction.106 When related taxpayers
attempt to deduct interest, especially under different accounting
methods, it is nearly impossible to monitor when payments are
actually made if the interest is accrued and the actual payments are not
made until several years later.107 This makes the job of the IRS
practically impossible and allows for companies to deduct for interest
payments that potentially are never paid.108
The legislative history also indicates that not only was Congress
concerned with the monitoring and compliance nightmare that could
easily ensue, but also with the ease with which taxpayers could engage
in “phantom transactions” that led to deductions for payments that
were either never made or manipulated in order to minimize liability
in a high tax year.109 The general purpose of the present § 267(a)(2)
was clear: it was intended “to prevent the allowance of a deduction
104

Under the 1937 law, Congress refused to allow a deduction for accruing an
interest obligation to a related party; rather in order to apply the deduction, the payor
had to actually pay the interest within approximately the same year as the accrual. Id.
105
Id.; Brief for the Appellant at 3, Tate & Lyle, In. v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue Serv., No. 95-7523 (3d Cir. Sep. 1995)) (citing H. Rep. No. 75-1546,
reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Pt. 2) 704, 724-25) (noting that “the rule was adopted
because Congress found that some accrual taxpayers were claiming deductions for
amounts owed to related parties as accrued, but thereafter never paid the amounts so
accrued).
106
Brief for the Appellant at 18-19, Tate &. Lyle, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue Serv., No. 95-7523 (3d Cir. Sep. 1995).
107
H.R. Rep. No. 75-1546 (1937), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Pt. 2) 704, 72425.
108
See id.
109
Id.
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without the corresponding inclusion in income.”110 When Congress
revisited this subject two years later it promulgated § 267(a)(3) which
requires the Secretary to “apply the matching principle of [I.R.C.
§ 267(a)(2)] in cases in which the person to whom the payment is
made is not a United States person.”111
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit followed the reasoning
articulated by the Third Circuit in Tate & Lyle, indicating that
Congress envisioned this provision to cover circumstances beyond an
accounting method mismatch, and to cover circumstances where the
foreign related party was not subject to U.S. tax liability.112 The
Seventh Circuit was persuaded by the Committee Reports that
Congress clearly intended and anticipated that the Code would cover
situations in which the cash basis accounting method would govern
even when there was no mismatch in accounting systems because the
foreign related party is not subject to U.S. tax liability.113 In light of
the legislative history, the Seventh Circuit’s determination was based
on whether the Regulation was reasonable in light of the overall
structure and purpose of the Code.114 Based on the Committee notes,
and in light of the overall fraud-prevention purpose of the provisions,
the Seventh Circuit held that the Commissioner’s decision to enact the
Regulation was reasonable despite the fact that it extended beyond
situations involving an accounting mismatch and included transactions
110

H.R. Rep. No. 98-432 (II) at 1025 (1984) reprinted in 1984 (vol. 3)
U.S.C.C.A.N 697, 1205 (widening the scope of the provision to address all
payments, not just interest payments, between related parties with different
accounting methods).
111
I.R.C. § 267(a)(3).
112
Tate & Lyle v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 87 F.3d 99, 105 (3d
Cir. 1996); see also H.R. Rep. 99-426 at 939 (1985) reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (Vol.
2) at 959; S. Rep. No. 99-313 at 959 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 (Vol. 3) at 959
(articulating a situation where the foreign parent was not subject to U.S. tax liability
but provided services to a U.S. company and thus the U.S. company was required to
use cash basis accounting).
113
Square D Co. v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 438 F.3d 739, 747
(7th Cir. 2006) (citing Tate & Lyle, 87 F.3d at 105; H. Rep. 99-426, at 940, 1986-3
C.B. (Vol. 2) at 940; S. Rep. 99-313, at 960, 1986-3 C.B. (Vol.3) at 960).
114
Square D, 438 F.3d at 747.
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where the foreign related party was not subject to U.S. tax liability.115
Further, given the history of manipulation of interest payments
between related parties, the Seventh Circuit determined that the
Commissioner’s decision to treat interest differently was well within
his purview and consistent with congressional intent.116
B. Tate & Lyle and the Tax Court’s Holding of the Invalidity of
Treasury Regulation 1.267(a)-(3)
Although the only circuits to address this issue have subscribed to
the interpretation articulated by the Seventh Circuit, the Tax Court in
Tate & Lyle held that the Regulation was an invalid exercise of the
authority granted by § 267(a)(3) of the Code.117 The foundation for
this holding is based in the plain language of the Code.118
The Tax Court recognized that it must “ordinarily defer to the
regulation if it implements the congressional mandate in some
reasonable manner.”119 Section 267(a)(2) of the Code provides
generally that a taxpayer may not deduct any amount owed to a related
party until it is includible in the payee’s gross income if the
mismatching occurs because the parties use different methods of
accounting.120 Although the Code does not explicitly define the term
“method of accounting” that term has the common usage to indicate
the cash basis method, the accrual method, or some combination of the
methods.121 Following this logic, a method of accounting is only
applicable to determine when an item is includable in gross income;
consequently, if the item is excluded from the entity’s gross income

115

Id.
Id.
117
Tate & Lyle v. Comm’r of the Internal Revenue Serv., 103 T.C. 656, 666
(1994).
118
Id.
119
Id. (citing United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967)).
120
Tate & Lyle, 103 T.C. at 666. (emphasis added).
121
Id.
116
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altogether, there is no method of accounting of which to speak.122
When the interest owed is not includable in gross income because, for
example, it was excluded from tax liability, such as in the case of a
treaty, then there is no method of accounting and the regulations are
not applicable to it.123 The plain language of the code is clear; the
statutory mandate in § 267(a)(3) is that it “applies the matching
principle of paragraph (2).”124 There is no reason to go beyond the
language of the statute and engage in an exploration of the legislative
history because the language clearly does not permit the Secretary to
promulgate Regulations that exceed the scope of the “matching
principle” to accounting methods as is articulated in § 267(a)(2).125
The Secretary is not permitted to promulgate regulations that would
alter the clear statutory scheme of the Code.126 Rather, the authority of
the Secretary is limited in scope to filling gaps in the Code and setting
forth regulations that clarify the implementation of the Code.127 The
Regulation as issued, which does not allow a taxpayer to accrue and
deduct interest owed to a foreign related party, is beyond the mandate
of the statutory authority, and is thus, invalid.128
The Tax Court addresses the argument that the Secretary’s
justification is based on an attempt to analogize to provisions
governing the original issue discount (“OID”).129 The Court
hypothesizes that the goal of the Regulation was to treat interest
deduction in the same way that deductions attributable to the original

122

Id. at 669.
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 670.
126
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S 837,
843-44 (1984); Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967) (noting that the deference given to
Treasury Regulation is based in the fact that Congress has delegated the task of
administering tax laws to the Secretary and thus the choice among reasonable
alternatives is his).
127
Id.
128
Tate & Lyle, 103 T.C. 656, 672 (1994).
129
Id. at 671.
123
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issue discount are treated.130 However, the Tax Court adheres to the
plain language and distinguishes the treatment of OID because there is
no language or provision that requires for the expansion of the reach of
the regulations beyond the matching principle articulated in
§ 267(a)(2) interpretation.131 The administrative authority conferred on
the Secretary is only to fill gaps; therefore, the Regulation as issued is
beyond the scope of that authority and contrary to the plain language
of the Code.
Although not addressed by the Tax Court, the Regulation could be
seen to place accrual taxpayers that engage in transactions with related
foreign parties at a disadvantage vis-à-vis taxpayers in similar
situations but dealing with a domestic related party. The primary
justification for the “matching principle” is so that there is a balance
between the deduction taken on interest paid and additional tax
liability recognized on interest income.132 However, when the income
is not included in payee’s gross income, the concerns from the IRS of
balancing tax liability seems to diminish because the income will
never generate U.S. tax revenue.133
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION WAS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE
FOLLOWED BY OTHER COURTS

The Seventh Circuit’s decision to uphold the validity of the
Regulation is correct and should be followed by other jurisdictions.
However, from the absence of many key arguments and the limited
rationale expounded by the Seventh Circuit, the basis for the decision
involved too much deference to the Third Circuit decision and the
authority of the Secretary.

130

Id.; I.R.C. § 163(e)(3).
Internal Revenue Code § 163(e)(3) provides that no deduction for original
issue discount on a debt instrument held by a related foreign person shall be allowed
until paid.
132
Tate & Lyle, 103 T.C. at 660-61.
133
See id.
131
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The tax context is unique, and admittedly has the need for
uniformity. Although deference is an important factor to consider, it is
not controlling and the Seventh Circuit must reason its decision based
on the arguments presented as opposed to merely following a like
interpretation from another circuit. Yet, despite the deficiencies in the
court’s reasoning and rationale, the decision was substantively correct.
The Tax Court in Tate & Lyle read the definition of “matching
principle” too narrowly. The Tax Court seems to confuse the
“matching principle” with the specified reason or cause for a
mismatch.134 Practically, § 267(a)(2) triggers the correction
contemplated by § 267.135 The provision articulated in § 267 is
logically read to indicate that mismatches in federal income tax
reporting, including accounting for interest expense and income are to
be avoided.136 The language of the provision indicates that it is not
aimed at remedying the reason that the mismatch occurred, but rather
remedying the effects of the mismatch.137 In terms of the domestic
taxpayers contemplated under § 267(a)(2)(A), given that both
taxpayers are domestic related parties it is obvious that the only way
that a mismatch could occur is because of different accounting
methods, as both parties are subject to the U.S. tax liability and
governed by the Code, meaning that they must utilize an approved
accounting method.138 However, the “specified reason or cause for a
mismatch (namely, a difference in accounting method) that triggers
corrections under § 267(a)(2) is not a part of the ‘matching
principle.’”139 Rather, the mismatch represents the “trigger” for the
134

Tate & Lyle v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 103 T.C. 656, 680-81
(1994) (Swift, J. dissenting).
135
Id.
136
See I.R.C § 267; e.g., Albertson’s Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 42
F.3d 537, 543 (9th Cir. 1994)(noting that generally the point of the “matching
principle” as used in § 404 is to prevent one party from taking a deduction for
payment until the other party includes the payment in its income, and is therefore
taxed on it).
137
See I.R.C § 267; Tate & Lyle, 103 T.C. at 680-81 (Swift, J. dissenting).
138
See Tate & Lyle, 103 T.C. at 680-81 (Swift, J. dissenting).
139
Id.
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matching principle that would result in a correction.140 Congress, in
1986, added § 267(a)(3) in recognition of the fact that when domestic
and foreign parties are involved in a transaction, mismatches occur for
reasons other than a difference in accounting systems.141 Congress
added § 267(a)(3) to remedy the effects of mismatches that are
triggered by circumstances other than a difference in accounting
methods.142 For example, a treaty would be a reason or cause for a
mismatch and would be within the authority of the Secretary to
determine the appropriate remedy and action.143 Applications of
treaties, such as the U.S.-France tax treaty, were entered into to
prevent double taxation (that is taxation on the same transaction by
two governments). In this case, the interest income will be taxed by
the country of France. In effect, the U.S. has acquiesced to the loss of
certain tax revenues in exchange for a more efficient allocation of
global resources and the influx of foreign capital. In order to give
credence to this treaty, it should be treated as a “trigger” causing a
mismatch and therefore, the matching principle should apply to
transactions between domestic corporations and foreign corporations
existing under a tax treaty.
An argument ignored by the Seventh Circuit is that Congress did
not relieve taxpayers from the requirements of § 267 where one of the
related parties is tax-exempt, as in the case of a charitable
organization, under § 501.144 It is inequitable that § 267 would apply
to domestic parties engaged in transactions with tax exempt parties,
but would not apply to domestic parties engaged with foreign tax

140

Id.
Id.
142
Id. (noting that Congress directed in § 267(a)(3) that the Commissioner, by
means of legislative regulations, provide other causes of mismatches between
domestic and foreign related parties to trigger the provisions of § 267); Brief for the
Appellant, supra note 106, at 10.
143
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 106, at 10 (stating that Judge Swift
considered the treaty-mandated an accounting method in and of itself).
144
See I.R.C. § 267(b)(9).
141
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exempt parties.145 In both cases the payee will never be including the
payment in its gross income, and will never be subject to U.S. tax
liability. From a policy perspective, there is no justification that the
reason why income is not taxed should make any difference.146
Whether income is “tax-exempt” as in the case of a charitable
organization or is exempt by reason of a tax treaty is irrelevant.147 The
“matching principle” is triggered wherever there is a mismatch, and
the reason why the mismatch occurs is irrelevant to the ability of the
Secretary to issue regulations. It naturally follows that the same
standards should apply to these groups because the scenarios are far
more analogous than two domestic corporations with different
accounting systems.
Another issue ignored by the Seventh Circuit, but that argues in
favor of its decision, is the parallel interpretation between the
Regulation and § 163(e)(3) with respect to original issue discount.148
Section 163(e)(3) requires a taxpayer to use the cash basis method of
accounting for deductions of original issue discount149 on debt
instruments held by foreign related parties.150 These provisions were
enacted to remedy the exact concerns that led Congress to enact
§ 267.151 Both provisions were aimed at preventing abuse by taking
tax deductions for payments never made.152 Further, the “definition of
foreign related person” in § 163(e)(3) contains a direct reference to
145

Tate & Lyle v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 103 T.C. 656, 679 (1994)
(Halpern, J. dissenting) (noting that is difficult to see any reason why one tax
exemption should be treated differently from another).
146
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 106, at 37.
147
Id.
148
I.R.C. § 163 (e)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3.
149
“Original issue discount” is defined as the excess, if any, of the stated
redemption price of a debt instrument at maturity over the issue price of the
instrument. I.R.C. § 1273 (a)(1).
150
Id. Note: this article will not address the validity of § 163(e)(3) or its
accompanying Treasury Regulations. This article will only address this issue in
relation to parallels and similarities with § 267.
151
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 106, at 39.
152
See id.
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§ 267(b).153 By defining related parties in this fashion, it can be
reasonably inferred that Congress envisioned in § 163(e)(3) and § 267
a natural overlap in application and interpretation between these two
provisions.154 One might argue that the absence of any reference to
§ 163(e)(3) in the legislative history of § 267 indicated that Congress
did not intend the provisions to parallel one another.155 The absence of
a reference in no way indicates that Congress intended to prohibit the
Secretary from issuing a similarly aimed regulation; it merely
demonstrates that Congress did not intend to require such a rule.156
Square D did not raise, and the Seventh Circuit did not address,
the impact that the level of deference to administration regulation
could have on the future viability of transactions with foreign related
parties. 157 Although Square D made a non-discrimination claim, which
was quickly dismissed by the Seventh Circuit, it never raised the
153

Id. (citing I.R.C. § 163(e)(3)).
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 106, at 39.
155
Tate & Lyle v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 103 T.C. 656, 671
(1994).
156
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 106, at 41.
157
Square D argued in the alternative that Reg. 1.267(a)-3 conflicted with the
Tax Treaty between the United States and France because it requires a U.S. taxpayer,
owned by a foreign [French] corporation to use the cash basis method of accounting
to deduct interest payment to its parent, rather than the more advantageous accrual
method. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that this argument failed because the type of
discrimination sought to be prevented was discrimination based solely on the foreign
ownership of the foreign-owned person. However, in this case, the regulation did not
dictate the use of the cash basis method based on the French ownership of Square D.
Rather, the dictate was based upon the fact that the interest payments were rendered
to a foreign party. Therefore, had Square D been owned by a domestic corporation,
any interest payment to a foreign related party would still be subject to the rule
putting Square D’s deduction on the cash basis method. The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that in order to violate the nondiscrimination clause in the treaty, the
additional burden levied must be directed at a nationality. Hence, since all
companies who engaged in transactions with foreign related parties resulting in
payment of interest were equally subject to this provision, whether owned by a
foreign or domestic parent company, there was no discrimination. Therefore, there
was no violation by the Reg. 1.267(a)-3 of the non-discrimination clause of the
Treaty. Square D, 438 F.3d at 747-48.
154
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question of where the foreseeable scope of these regulations might
end.158 In the Seventh Circuit’s holding, it indicated its propensity to
defer to administrative regulation, without a full exploration of the
arguments, under the justification of prevention of fraud.159 For
example, in an effort to prevent fraud and ease the burden of tracking
deductions, the next step might be to eliminate the ability of a taxpayer
to take advantage of the interest deduction when the payee is any
foreign party. Although this is an extreme example, given the current
distrust of corporate America and prevalence of scandal, without an
adequate check on administrative regulation, these regulations could
easily exceed their intended scope. Reviewing courts are charged with
conducting a thorough analysis to ensure that administrative regulation
is reasonable. Absent such an analysis it is possible that the Secretary
will exceed the scope of its authority and do more harm than good for
American Corporations.
However, in light of the much stricter regulations upheld affecting
transactions with foreign related parties, the interpretation of the
Regulation at issue in Square D is consistent with the deference
applied to other similarly aimed regulations.160 Although the subject
matter of these laws varies quite broadly over a spectrum of topics,
they all share one common goal: to prevent fraud and abuse by
corporations.161 Given the serious nature and consequences of these
regulations, courts must hesitate before granting broad deference and
latitude to the agencies charged with ensuring compliance. It is a very
fine line between reasonable enforcement of these provisions as
initially intended and allowing these regulations to be carried to
illogical extremes, impairing American corporations by placing them
on unequal footing in a global marketplace. Therefore, it is critical that
reviewing courts engage in a thorough analysis of any administrative
158

Id.
See id. at 747 (stating that although the use of the cash basis method may
seem “counter-intuitive” it is justified by the potential to prevent “fraud and abuse by
taxpayers).
160
See, e.g., Boeing Co v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2003); Tate & Lyle v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 87 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 1996).
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See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163, 267, 446
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regulation aimed at preventing fraud in taxation before granting
deference to an administrative regulation.
CONCLUSION
There is no debate that adequate regulation of corporate
transactions is important. Proof of this fact has never been more
evident than in the past few years when the effects of corporate
wrongdoing have been recognized at the greatest level. For the
purposes of tax liability, related party transactions are one of the most
commonly abused vehicles.
Both the Seventh and Third Circuit have upheld the validity of the
Regulation requiring a taxpayer to use the cash basis method of
accounting to deduct interest payments to foreign related persons. This
decision represents a trend toward greater regulation and discretion for
the agencies charged with promulgating these regulations. Although
these decisions should be narrowly construed and not used as
precedent for sweeping deference to administrative regulation they
were correctly decided. The burden that this regulation imposes is both
necessary and mild in light of the context of other similarly aimed
regulations. As such, the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Square D is
correct and all other circuits addressing this narrow issue should
follow the decision. However, the absence of extensive reasoning by
the Seventh Circuit should not be read to indicate that, in the context
of administrative regulation under the Code, all regulation is good
regulation.
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